Part two: Government

Government

Indonesia is easily the most broken-up country in the world, and its sheer expanse and diversity make it awesomely difficult to govern. On the state crest are the old Sanskrit words Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, 'We are many but we are one.' This line is played hard by Indonesia's leaders, who try to bring unity to the country by invoking nationalistic ceremonies; claiming a mystical, divine mandate to rule; and pushing a national fitness program of senam pagi (morning exercise), practiced every morning in even the most remote hill villages. The Indonesian language is another effective unifying force.

To bring all the diverse people of this sprawling island nation together within the political and geographic entity called Indonesia will always be the greatest single problem facing its leaders. Along with such typical fundamental problems of a developing Third World nation as overpopulation, unemployment, and lack of an industrial base and technical expertise, the widely dispersed group of 17,000 islands suffers from an uneven population and unequal distribution of natural wealth. In addition, it's a massive job trying to usher a feudal agrarian society into the 20th century.

The country's gigantic conservatism, low-key Indonesian temperament, almost feudal deference to established authority, docile resignation of the masses, and omnipresent army keep the government in power. Resignation is in fact a great asset, providing people with the patience to endure a succession of demagogic, inept, and unjust rulers. Indonesians are most concerned that the government satisfies them--food in their bellies, a roof over their heads, clothes to cover them.

Indonesia's most pressing issues are independence movements in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya; tension between pribumi and the Chinese; the role of the armed forces in an increasingly complex society; uneven distribution of wealth; and the political frustrations of the middle class at a time of rising expectactions. There's a widespread feeling of resentment over the business activities of Suharto's children, several of whom are the richest people in Indonesia. Their avarice offends not only pribumi businessmen, but the World Bank, which is pushing for abolition of the wildly lucrative monopolies hampering vital sections of the economy. The behavior of his own family is Suharto's Achilles' heel.

The New Order

The soft-spoken Suharto rose to power in 1965-66 because he controlled a key position in the Indonesian army during a crisis. During the 30-year period since his ascension, Suharto has excelled in clever political maneuverings, controlling internal army politics, and accumulating and reinforcing his power by gathering around him committed and powerful people. The armed forces under his command have played a central role in the nation's development, and provide Suharto with his pervasive base of power.

Suharto receives high marks for guiding the aggressive political, economic, and social reforms of the 1970s. The basic policies he has instituted have resulted in a remarkably stable political and economic climate. The enormous increase in the power of the state has made the rule of law firmer. For those who lived through the turbulent Sukarno years, this is no insignificant gain.

Since 1967 competing power blocs have unceasingly struggled for greater influence and position in the government. Although Bung Harto maintains a firm grip, the military, cabinet, civilian bureaucracy, parliament, technocrats, academics, businesspeople, foreign investors, ethnic Chinese, Islamic groups, and Christians all jockey for increased power and prestige.

The left is something Suharto doesn't need to worry about. The massacres of 1965-68 wiped out the left; yet Suharto cruelly presides over pathetic purges to this day. A few tired old communist leaders were executed as late as 1985; several oil companies were then required to dismiss more than 1,500 employees said to have been associated with the PKI. In the outskirts of Jakarta, a Communist Party Treachery Museum has opened, and in 1992 superpatriot Try Sutrisno, Indonesia's vice president, warned against a possible resurgence of communism. Those who speak out for human rights and democracy come from the new left, said he, damning them as 'fourth generation' communists. BAKIN, the state political security organ, keeps an ever-watchful eye.

The Islamic population is more problematic. Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world, and rising Muslim consciousness poses one of the greatest potential threats to the regime. In September 1984 there were bloody Muslim riots at the port of Jakarta; troops clashed with extremists, leaving hundreds dead. The burning of a few Christian churches in East Java and an attack on a busload of Chinese workers in the 1990s have been the most hostile manifestations of Indonesia's new radical Muslim fundamentalism, although many see this violence as aimed more at the Chinese (most of whom are Christian) than at Christianity. Some fear modernization, the influx of Western culture, economic injustice, and rampant government corruption may push alienated youth in the direction of Muslim extremism.


Succession
All agree Suharto has lingered too long. Yet he's always claimed legitimancy by cloaking himself and his regime in the garments of the constitution, saying he'll step down only if the reins of state are passed in an orderly manner according to the precepts of that document.

Anyone interested in Indonesia's next president should look carefully at the country's new vice president. Try Sutrisno was elected vice president with the support of all factions at the MPR assembly in 1992. He was nominated by the armed forces bloc, the same bloc that so vociferously opposed Suharto's previous choice. Born in Surabaya in 1935, Sutrisno entered the army in 1956. He served as Suharto's aide-de-camp in 1974 and became the top military man in 1987. A masterful consensus builder is he, but a diplomat he is not. As commander of the armed forces he defiantly dismissed the army's 1991 massacre of 171 unarmed civilians in Dili as a trifling 'incident' and declared all opposition on East Timor should be shot. During the entire crisis Sutrisno unflinchingly supported the army's explanation of events.

In the tradition of Javanese kings who rule by divine right and only part from their rule by death, Suharto will probably remain president--health permitting--through the late 1990s. With four coordinating ministers at his disposal, his job will be less taxing. But a well-prepared and well-managed transition will not be easy. His successor will begin with much less power than Suharto enjoyed during his 30 years as president, and will probably have to share what power he does have with other state bodies.

One never knows what Suharto will do next. He has built and maintained his position of power by outmaneuvering and outguessing his opponents. The preeminent Australian journalist David Jenkins has written that during the past 30 years 'Suharto's greatest asset has been an inscrutability so pervasive that at times not even his closest associates have been quite sure what he is thinking.'

System Of Government

Administratively, Indonesia is divided into 27 provinces, each headed by a governor nominated by a provincial legislature and approved and appointed by the central government. Akin to the U.S. states, each province has its own provincial capital. The provinces are further divided into regencies, subdistricts, and municipalities.


Pancasila
The concept of Pancasila ('Five Principles'), authored by Sukarno during the Japanese occupation, is the basis of civilized rule. The government urges all Indonesians to accept this state ideology as their fundamental political philosophy, crucial to national unity. Displayed on practically every government building, the emblem of the five sila, or principles, are: 1) belief in one supreme God; 2) a just and civilized humanity; 3) nationalism, the unity of Indonesia; 4) democracy, guided by the wisdom of unanimity arising from discussion (musjawarah) and mutual assistance (gotong royong); and 5) social justice, the equality of political rights and the rights of citizenship, as well as social and cultural equality. Each regime tends to interpret these five concepts in a way that will further its social and political goals.

Indonesian political leaders point out that since the majority of Indonesians share strong cultural values--adhering to a sort of a pan-Indonesian superculture--it follows that Indonesians should share the same political culture as well. They argue that the collectivist adat of traditional village culture is ideally adapted to consensual politics, with the weight of decision-making falling on the shoulders of a society's elders. The Pancasila state philosophy is often used to justify the military's heavy-handed grip on both civilian and government affairs.


The State Organs
According to the text of the country's 1945 constitution, still in effect, the nation is a republic, with sovereignty residing in the people. Functions of the government include executive, legislative, and judicial, but there is no specific separation of powers, no system of checks and balances. The constitution provides for a strong president who serves a term of five years. Apparently, this highest government executive may be reelected indefinitely; it's up to the president to accept or reject another term. Suharto was overwhelmingly reelected to serve a sixth five-year term in March 1993. Only Cuba's Fidel Castro has served longer as a head of state.

Suharto's cabinet, officially called Development Cabinet VI, is responsible only to him. With a current membership of 41, the new cabinet is the world's largest, after China's. Previous cabinets promulgated policies to improve agriculture, as the president has always had a soft spot for farmers. The present cabinet, however, is intent on turning Indonesia into a modern industrial state. The man most responsbile for the realignment of the president's priorities is Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie. This German-trained aeronautical engineer has turned to politics to advance his vision of a modern Indonesia that can take its place beside the tigers of Southeast Asia--Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Habibie is equally committed to developing a qualified, skilled workforce to implement Indonesia's ambitious technological programs.

The president himself is directly responsible only to the Majellis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), the People's Consultative Assembly. This 'super parliament' consists of 1,000 farmers, workers, students, businesspeople, clergy, intellectuals, and military types--a heterogeneous body meant to represent a wide cross-section of society. The MPR meets every five years to select a president and endorse the general policy guidelines for the president's next five-year term.

Just because Indonesia has a parliament doesn't mean it's a democracy. Although empowered by the constitution with the highest authority of state, in reality the MPR is a classic rubber-stamp body that rarely meets and never decides important issues. Members must pass an ideological screening administered by the military, and the president has the final right to approve MPR appointees. At least 60% of the body works for the government party; nearly 200 are admirals, generals, or air marshals.

The 500-member Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), or House of Representatives, is a legislative body that sits at least once a year. Only 400 members are elected; the remaining 100 seats are reserved for armed forces personnel. DPR representatives are not known for their candor and outspokenness. Every statute passed by the DPR requires the approval of the president.

The judiciary cannot impeach, nor can it rule on the constitutionality of decrees or legislation promulgated by the other branches of government. The number of sitting supreme court judges varies from 15 to 20; they preside over 300 subordinate courts scattered across the country's 27 provinces. Adequate qualified staffing is a major problem bedeviling the scope and speed of settlements.


Political Parties And The Electoral Process
The government Golkar party, founded in 1964 as a counterbalance to growing PKI influence, enjoys the full backing of the army and bureaucracy. This all-powerful government political machine, with almost unlimited resources, dominates all levels of government. Golkar represents the armed forces, the bureaucracy, farmers, women's organizations, students, and many other 'functional groups' (golongan karya). Golkar always wins.

The Muslim United Development Party (PPP) is plagued by internal friction. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), also weakened by internal bickering, is a coalition of Christians and Sukarnoists. Nine political parties challenged Golkar in 1971; in 1973 the government forced them all into the PDI and PPP. No additional parties are permitted. Golkar has a virtual monopoly on the political loyalty of all cabinet ministers as well as Indonesia's four million civil servants. All parties must adopt Pancasila as a sole political philosophy. Golkar screens the candidates for the other two parties, often installing a particularly unpopular character to further tilt the election in its favor. Opposition candidates are also investigated by Indonesia's powerful internal security agency. Candidates, if elected, may also be 'recalled' at the pleasure of the government.

Although political campaigns have an exciting, carnival-like, grassroots atmosphere, Indonesia's electoral process is actually heavily managed and controlled. Little effort is expended in educating the people to inform their political choices. Indonesians have a vote but not a say. The whole process is designed to demonstrate the government's legitimacy to its people and the world, while avoiding as much as possible any real contest among competing political parties.

Electioneering by opposition forces is not permitted in villages, where four out of five Indonesians live. Since only Golkar can organize on the village level, if you don't vote for Golkar you won't get a new village school or agricultural co-op. Voting is not compulsory, but government officials in provincial districts apply pressure on village heads to get out the vote for Golkar. Campaigns are limited to 25 days, with a one week 'quiet period' just prior to the election. Golkar issues the permits required to hold political rallies, where criticisms of government policies and discussion of religious or racial issues are forbidden.

Voters select parties, not individuals. The voting occurs in small polling stations in workplaces and residential areas, where political loyalties are closely monitored. Civil servants vote at their offices and must ask permission from their superiors if they intend to vote for a party other than Golkar.

Administration--Local And Federal

Gotong Royong

Gotong royong means joint responsibility and mutual cooperation of the whole community, all working together to achieve common ends. With origins in much earlier times, this is an all-important institution in Indonesian village life. Indonesia consists of tens of thousands of villages and the tradition of gotong royong is the real grassroots base of political rule.

Whenever fire, flood, earthquake, or volcanic eruption strikes, when pipelines break down or a dam needs building or repairing, the principle of gotong royong goes into effect. If a rice field must be harvested, all have a right and duty to help, receiving a share of the crop as compensation. If a house must be built, other villagers join in the building, expecting the same in return. Men usually work with their own tools and without pay. Sometimes neighboring villagers are expected to help. If a village follows this communal organization, no household will be without land to farm, work to subsist, food to eat. Anyone in trouble will receive help.

The system revolves around thousands of village headmen (lurah or kepala desa), who coordinate gotong royong programs and carry out government policies. Lurah rule by assigning friends and assistants to tasks, a sort of administration by relationships. Loyalties to family, village, and friends are more important than self-advancement. The government greatly encourages this village socialism--it makes the government's job much easier, enabling the country to almost run itself.


Musjawarah And Mufakat
The native political process is built on ancient Javanese customs. The Arabic words musjawarah (discussion) and mufakat (consensus) describe methods of resolving political, policy, and personal differences by prolonged deliberation ending in unanimous decision. These methods are used both in the state's highest legislative body and at the humblest village meetings. Indonesians don't believe in the Western-style system of decision-making by voting, where the majority of 50% plus one gets its way, a method disdained as 'dictatorship of the majority.' Indonesians believe this system isn't fair; the will of the minority is just as important as that of the majority, so the council just talks itself out until all parties come to an accord, too exhausted or too hoarse to discuss the issue any further. The process proceeds slowly, but all points of view are eventually brought together in one compromise agreement.


The Bureaucracy
You'll have ample opportunity to observe at close range Indonesia's ponderous, octopus-like, highly centralized bureaucracy. In the outer areas, you'll often have to seek information or aid from the local camat, or apply for a surat jalan from the office of the bupati (mayor). If there's any possibility an official may get in trouble for granting you permission, he'll insist upon the decision first clearing Jakarta. Petty officials are everywhere. Indonesia is a land of a million dictators.

The bureaucracy is a privileged class. Positions in local government bring prestige, job security, and steady pay, and openings are hotly contested. Local authorities in Indonesia's 3,500 subdistricts and 62,900 villages function as extensions of the central government, charged with imposing Jakarta's tight political and administrative grip on local affairs. But in spite of its hierarchal appearance, the real glue holding the whole structure together is the phenomenon of bapakism, which encourages a collectivist, familial attitude toward society. A father figure, the bapak, supervises a circle of loyal underlings in every bureaucratic office.

After three centuries of Dutch rule, the Indonesians achieved independence in 1949 with virtually no skills in administration and government service above junior-management level. Indonesian officials were allowed to decide inconsequential departmental matters, but for weightier issues the Dutch decided for them. During this period there evolved a tradition of invariably channeling the more important decisions to the top, a time-honored practice that explains the extreme paternalism and painfully slow decison-making process in the Indonesian bureaucracy today.

The Armed Forces

Indonesia's armed forces were founded in 1945 during the revolution against the Dutch. From that time to the present, the army has been the most powerful of all the services. Most of the soldiers and officers in the army were former members of the Dutch colonial army and the Japanese-sponsored militia Pembela Tanah Air (PETA). During the period of Guided Democracy (1959-65), Sukarno promoted the navy, air force, and police as distinct branches in an attempt to curb the power of the army.

Under the direct control of the president and the ministry of defense, the armed forces consists of the army (Angkatan Darat), navy (Angkatan Laut), air force (Angkatan Udara), and police (Polisi Negara). A central command (ABRI) coordinates all four services. Armed forces personnel number 284,000, with another 800,000 in reserve. Duty in hazardous counterinsurgency war zones like East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh does wonders for the career track of a professional soldier. The military's arsenal includes F-16 fighter planes and A-4 Sky Hawks; work is progressing on ballistic missiles.

The military is the nation's only credible political power. The service provides the country with its president, half its ambassadors, two-thirds of its regional governors, and half its ministers. From its inception, retired military men have secured up to 80% of the leadership posts in Golkar, the government party. The army's power and prestige in national affairs is a legacy of its role in the war against the Dutch. Since the armed forces feels it won independence, saved the country from 1948 and 1965 communist uprisings, and came to the rescue on several other occasions when civilian authority was found wanting, it believes it has a god-given right and moral duty to continue to rule over Indonesia's civilian population. In nearly every village of Indonesia you find the inevitable memorial to the brave martyrs of the revolution, as if the government never wants the people to forget to whom they owe their gratitude for freeing them.

The Dutch occupation of western New Guinea and the retaliatory 1957 takeover of Dutch businesses and property greatly expanded the army's role in the economy. Army officers began managing businesses, the income supplementing the meager funds available to them through conventional channels. Today Javanese 'financial generals' and retired generals own monopolies, corporations, shipping lines, hotels, import firms, factories, mines, and oil wells.


Dwi Fungsi
The army also considers itself a sociopolitical force, a role enshrined in the doctrine of dwi fungsi, or dual function, which calls for its extensive participation in politics and government. Thus, there's an army level of command corresponding to each function of the civil government from the provincial level right down to the village. Starting in 1980 with the ABRI masuk desa program, the military began to assist in public works projects in the countryside to improve its public image and help rural development. The military also views its participation in the day-to-day running of the country as a necessary part of the national defense strategy. A typical military officer's career consists of serving alternate stints in both regional and combat commands; he then 'retires' into the civil bureaucracy.


The Dili Massacre
In November 1991 Indonesian troops killed 171 peaceful, unarmed East Timorese mourners at a Dili funeral, a blunder that sparked an outcry all over the world. Jakarta claimed the 'regrettable tragedy' was an overreaction by low-level soldiers who believed they were defending themselves. But the massacre was the most serious abuse of military power since independence. Canada, Denmark, and Holland immediately cut off aid, there were protests at the Indonesian embassy in Australia, and the massacre was the root of a 1993 foreign-relations crisis with the United States.

The subsequent investigation of what the government insisted on calling an 'incident' was the first independent inquiry into military conduct under the New Order regime. Two top generals in East Timor were fired, and, eight months after the massacre, 10 soldiers were sentenced to one year in prison. Though this was the first time in Indonesian history that soldiers were prosecuted for human rights violations, the sentences were grossly disproportionate to the number of people killed.

Censorship, Propaganda, And Civil Liberties

Although the Indonesian constitution guarantees freedom of the press and speech, censorship is taken for granted in Indonesia. Accompanying the economic deregulation of 1988 was a tendency towards keterbukaan, or openness, in Indonesian society, but by the early '90s the publishing industry was under siege once again. In June 1994 the government banned three weeklies in one day--Tempo, Petik, and Editor. Their crimes included reports on conflicts between the military and the research and technology minister over refitting 39 German ships, and disclosures that the trial of a Chinese businessman accused of 'losing' $430 million in state funds involved associates of Suharto. Information Minister Harmoko damned the publications as purveyors of 'alcoholic journalism.'

In Indonesian government circles, freedom of the press is regarded as less important than stability and harmony among the people. There is no exchange of opinions, only a one-way monologue from the government down to the people. In the past 10 years, the New Order regime has banned the publication of over 120 books and periodicals. As a result, the country's domestic newspapers often stretch or omit the truth. A law requiring all publications and press corporations to obtain an operating license means not only an offending publication but also the parent company can be closed down. Publishing management staff must receive police clearance and vow never to engage in anti-Pancasila activities.

No formalized, institutionalized censorship guidelines exist. Whim and whimsy determines what will be censored. If Indonesia's attorney general determines a book has the capacity to disturb law and order, it is banned. Ban orders may not be debated openly in public, and the Indonesian Publisher's Association has not once remonstrated against a government ban order. Journalists work under extreme constraints and can be blacklisted. Artists and performers likewise lament that the government's obsession with security is like a black hole swallowing all independent thought and ideas. They fear that 30 years of repression has slowly killed the country's cultural life and that Indonesia will never produce important literature or drama. In 1989 the authorities arrested two Yogyakarta students for circulating the works of Indonesia's greatest living novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a former PKI sympathizer. After a show trial condemning those who would 'disturb the stability and success of national development,' the students were sentenced to eight years in jail. If you go to a movie and wonder why the main character suddenly vanishes, that's the long reach of the government. The hero was too antisocial or amoral, or the film too sexually explicit. Films of primitive Indonesian people such as the Asmat of Irian Jaya, or films depicting poverty or environmental pollution, cannot be shown, as the authorities believe they portray the country in a bad light. In July 1993 a student was prosecuted in Central Java for circulating a calendar cataloging incidents of abuse by the military.

Sure-fire ways to guarantee your publication will be yanked from the shelves include negative commentary about the president or his family's multibillion dollar investments, direct criticism of the army, accounts of demonstrations or insurgency movements in East Timor or Irian Jaya, and any news item that offends religious sensibilities. Licenses may be revoked for leaking a proposed economic program. Three journalists for the weekly magazine Jakarta-Jakarta, who published interviews with crucial eyewitnesses to the Dili Massacre, subsequently lost their jobs. In mid-1986 a whole planeload of Australian tourists was barred from entry because of a scathing editorial by David Jenkins in the Sydney Morning Herald that compared Suharto to Marcos and accused the president, his family, and business associates of 'waxing fat on government capital, credit, and concessions, and accumulating $2-3 billion.' Pages critical of Indonesia are often blacked out of such imported weeklies as Far Eastern Economic Review, Time, and Newsweek. Foreign journalists may be denied visas if they're too candid in their reporting. Steven Erlanger of the New York Times, who also wrote about the Suharto family's business dealings, was banned in 1990. Pat Walsh, a prominent Australian human rights activist, was refused entry to Indonesia in November 1992. And the book you hold in your hands has, since the mid-'70s, been unavailable for sale in Indonesia.


Civil Liberties
Indonesia's military bureaucratic state can best be described as an open patriarchal dictatorship. Don't think Big Brother is always watching. The Javanese are a softer civilization than the North Koreans or Saudis. There's authoritarianism, but not mind control.

The rule of formal, court-upheld law doesn't exist here. Legal rules are made up day-by-day according to need. Regulations can be stretched much more in Indonesia than in the West; problems can often be worked out before they come to a confrontation. Because adat affords so much latitude and reinterpretation, the amount of personal liberty in practice is astonishingly high. Government controls actually felt by the people are extremely limited compared to places like the U.S., where government regulations, laws, and taxes touch every individual every day.

All this social freedom should not hide the fact that legal injustices occur. P. Kooijmans, who visited Java and East Timor at the behest of the United Nation's Commission on Human Rights, reports that torture during detention is particularly apt to occur in politically unstable areas like East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh. A law passed in 1992 bars the return of Indonesian citizens who engage in 'anti-Indonesian' activities abroad. Another law requires all 'social organizations' to submit to scrutiny by the ministry of the interior. The military also routinely intervenes in industrial disputes.


Dissent
One of the most significant challenges to the Suharto regime was an open petition signed by 50 prominent national figures, including 1945-generation military men, politicians, academics, and students. This document became known as the 'Petition of 50 Group.' Reacting to an April 1980 Suharto speech, where he implied he was the embodiment of Pancasila, the group accused the president of virtually usurping the government and heading a corrupt and maladministered regime. The government's reaction was swift and unrelenting. All news coverage of the event was banned, members of the group were prohibited from overseas travel, and firms associated with the dissidents had their government contracts cancelled. The petition's most famous signatory was A.H. Nasution, founder of the Indonesian army and Suharto's former superior.

These tensions led to violence during the parliamentary campaign of May 1982, when opponents of the government attempted to disrupt what they believed were rigged elections. In Benteng Square rioters hurled rocks and burned automobiles; troops were ordered to 'shoot on the spot' anyone who attempted to disturb the polling. Admiral Sudomo, head of national security, assured a group of ASEAN journalists, 'we will shoot very cautiously, for this is a democracy.' Sixty people were killed and 1,334 injured. In 1984 there were more riots and bombings, and show trials were staged in 1986.

These days the president, the military, and various important ministers are attempting a reconciliation. Former adversaries have been photographed smiling and shaking hands with the president; Nasution and Suharto have even met. All this high media drama has led optimists to believe the government is genuinely committed to openness and the right of its citizens to nonviolent dissent. Though there has recently been an unprecedented amount of dissident views expressed in the Indonesian press--unthinkable even several years ago--harsh prison terms are still meted out. East Timorese students who protested the Dili massacre in front of the UN building and other diplomatic missions in Jakarta in 1992 were sentenced to 10 months to 10 years for 'hostility toward the government' and 'subversion.'

Jakartan Centralism

The government is centered on Java, and is also intensely Java-centered. Indonesia's is not a truly representative government; the Javanese are in effect the new colonialists of the archipelago. An elite of perhaps 2,000 Javanese men manipulate Indonesian politics. With only a dozen or so exceptions, they all speak English, drive new Japanese cars, live in Jakarta, and are Javanese.

There has always been tension and conflict between the seafaring, mercantile Muslim states of Indonesia's Outer Islands and the bureaucratic, powerful, Hinduized forces of Java. Outer Island ethnic groups have come to resent Java's heavy-handed overlordship. Colonialism, whether by white Dutch Europeans or brown Javanese Asians, is equally unacceptable to Indonesia's Outer Island peoples. Many would prefer a looser federation to ensure a more just distribution of national wealth and power.


The Threat Of Separatism
The threat of secession always looms large in this scattered island nation. Overpopulated Java couldn't possibly survive on its own; when any of the resource-rich Outer Islands gets uppity, Java sends bombers and assault troops to quell secessionist uprisings. There were serious revolts in 1949 in southern Maluku and in 1959 in Sumatra and North Sulawesi because Java took too much of the revenues from these regions for its own enrichment. It's now deliberate government policy to constantly rotate provincial chiefs of police and military district heads throughout Indonesia to prevent power consolidation and keep secessionist challenges to a minimum. In the civilian sector, the central government also appoints provincial as well as kabupaten (regency) and kotmadya (municipality) heads, even though elected local assemblies are in place.

International Relations

Foreign Aid

Since Suharto's takeover in 1967, Indonesia has received hundreds of millions of dollars in diplomatic, economic, and military support from the developed nations. Japan provides the largest share of Indonesia's foreign-development capital. Lesser but still substantial sums come from the U.S., Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Australia. More than humanitarian interest motivates investment in the region. Indonesia sits on Southeast Asia's largest and richest oil reserves, is an influential member of OPEC, possesses an unlimited and untapped labor pool, and controls the strategic Straits of Malacca, through which ships must pass from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Maintaining Indonesia's position as the largest country in Southeast Asia, and perhaps the only one with the potential to become a major world power, is of prime importance to the stability of the entire region.

Suharto and his ministers, understandably sensitive over their human rights and environmental records, have reiterated again and again that aid, loans, and trade must not be predicated on Indonesia's internal policies. No amount of Western aid has ever guaranteed Indonesian support of donar contries. In March 1992, Jakarta asked the Netherlands to discontinue its aid program following Dutch protests over the 1991 Dili Massacre. It further requested the Dutch-directed IGGI be dissolved.

The U.S. also became increasingly critical of Indonesia's handling of events in East Timor. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved an amendment linking arms sales to Indonesia to human rights in East Timor, the first time arms sales to a U.S. ally were tied to human rights concerns. Indonesian leaders reacted by calling for diversifying their arms sources and reducing ties to the U.S.


The Nonaligned Movement
Indonesia founded the nonaligned movement (NAM) at the historic Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955; President Suharto assumed the 108-member movement's leadership in 1991. The 10th summit was held in Jakarta in 1992, when 60 heads of government and assorted dignitaries heard Suharto outline future priorities in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Indonesia considers itself a stable role model for other NAM nations. Though Suharto encourages members to place greater emphasis on economic and human concerns, political and ideological issues still dominate the organization. Indonesia's own human rights and environmental records point to a gap between what it says and what it does--there were mass detentions in Dili before and during the NAM conference to quell protests designed to capture the attention of the international press.

During the Sukarno years, Indonesia developed close ties with China and the Soviet Union and was openly hostile to what Sukarno called the Old Established Forces (NEFOS), the developed nations of the West. Although Indonesia today vigorously espouses Asian neutralism and an independent approach to foreign affairs, in reality Suharto has aligned his nation closely with the West. The G-7 industrialized countries were invited to attend the NAM economic cooperation and development meeting on Bali in May 1993.


Regional Relations
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 along the lines of NATO, the European-based multinational alliance, and consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. In the post-cold war world, it was hoped ASEAN would become an important vehicle for Asia/Pacific consultations and dialogue aimed at promoting economic development through regional cooperation. In reality, little has been achieved. Members have consistently disagreed on the level of developed nation participation in their economies. ASEAN's most recent success has been acting as intermediary for the warring parties in Cambodia, with Suharto an active player.

Indonesia also hopes to provide quality products at competitive prices to the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA). Yet another new interregional body, the 10-member Council for Security in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), coordinates discussions between nongovernmental groups on Pacific security matters.

Suharto himself has launched a number of diplomatic initiatives in the past several years. Indonesia suspended its relations with China after the 1965 coup, but in 1989 Suharto bypassed his foreign minister and minister of trade to normalize relations with China. Suharto also visited Moscow in 1989 to established bilateral trade with Gorbachev's government. Another remarkable foray was Suharto's November 1990 state visit to Vietnam, ending that country's 15-year isolation in Southeast Asia--a gesture Vietnam will never forget.